Buy American
Colonel James Wolfe Ripley and the English
Enfield Rifles
by William R. Forstchen
(From It Seemed Like a Good Idea… A
Compendium of Great Historical Fiascoes
by William R. Forstchen and Bill Fawcett)
Colonel
James Ripley, West Point class of 1813, may very well have been responsible for
the bloody four-year length of the American Civil War, a conflict which might
have ended in a matter of months. Sixty-seven years old when he assumed control
of the Ordnance Department of the United States Army in 1861, Ripley disdained
any innovations proposed for arming the burgeoning armies of the North. Amongst
Civil War buffs he is well known as the man who used every bureaucratic means
possible to block the introduction of breech-loading weapons for the infantry,
especially the rapid-firing Spencer rifle, which he claimed would only
encourage men to "waste ammunition, which is expensive." His greatest
folly, however, was not a sin of commission, but rather of omission, and it
cost the lives of tens of thousands of soldiers on both sides.
The story
begins in 1852 when England sponsored the first of the modern World's Fairs at
the newly constructed Crystal Palace. The American display was opened with
nothing more than boxes of machined parts. Volunteers were taken from the
audience, and within a matter of minutes guided through the assembling of these
parts into a fully functional Colt revolver, a masterpiece of precision
interchangeable manufacturing. So revolutionary was this demonstration that the
British Parliament assigned a commission to travel to America to unlock the
secrets of this new technology, and one of their first stops was at the
Springfield Armory, which at this point was just gearing up for mass production
of the new 1855 model Springfield .58 Rifled Musket. Awed by this precision
capability, the British government purchased a full working factory.
Within three
years the British began manufacturing their own rifled musket, the .577 caliber
Enfield, which was nearly identical to the American Springfield except for
slight modifications in the hammer and a three thousandths of an inch
difference in caliber.
The advent
of hostilities in America caught the federal army completely flat-footed,
though some would later claim that Jefferson Davis, Secretary of War under
Buchanan, had in fact deliberately sabotaged key decisions for preparation
while still in office. The army was less than 20,000 strong, but far more
importantly the stockpile of modem weapons which should have existed, was in
fact nonexistent. The model 1855 Springfields that were on hand numbered only
in the tens of thousands, of which many were in Southern armories. Weapons
dating all the way back to the Revolution were all that were available in
various state armories.
Three days
after the Confederates fired on Fort Sumter, Lincoln called for 75,000
volunteers, and by the end of the summer further calls went out for an
additional half million men. The biggest problem facing the Union was not
getting volunteers-in fact men were actually being turned away-but rather how
to arm them. This was the situation that landed on Colonel Ripley's desk.
First off,
Ripley announced that he saw no problem with smoothbore weapons, which had
worked well enough for the army he fought with in 1812, but if everyone
insisted on rifled weapons, the rifled muzzle loader would be good enough to
serve. There was one little wrinkle though: it would take a year or more for
the Springfield armory and various subcontractors to manufacture the needed
weapons. Any mention of turning to private arms manufacturers to manufacture
high-tech repeating weapons was rejected out of hand.
Faced with
this dilemma, a staff officer serving under Ripley presented a very simple
solution to the crisis: go to England and purchase the needed Enfields from
them.
They were
offering the weapons at rock-bottom prices on a cash-and-carry basis because by
this time the British were already considering an upgrade to breech-loading
weapons. As a result, the Union army could be fully armed within a couple of
months.
Colonel
James Ripley, however, went through the roof when approached with the idea. He
had once fought the British, and the mere thought of now running to them for
weapons was beneath contempt. In addition, Ripley openly stated his opinion
that the war would be over by the end of the summer, so the purchase of several
hundred thousand rifles would prove to be a total waste; the armies would
already be demobilizing by the time the new weapons arrived. Finally he
presented the most telling argument of all: that this was an American war and
he intended to buy American. Anything less would be unpatriotic!
The staffer
retreated from this tirade, mulled things over, and then returned several days
later with a far more convincing argument that he knew would win the old man
over. -Intelligence sources were reporting that Confederate agents were already
in England negotiating to buy up every Enfield in stock, as well as contracting
for additional production runs. Ripley again hit the roof, but not in panic. He
responded that if the Confederates wanted to buy the damned English guns that
was their business and not his.
Then he
again asserted that the war would still be over before the guns would even come
into play, and that American soldiers would go to battle armed with
American-made guns. The staffer persisted, finally arguing that for the good of
the cause, if need be, the Federal government should outbid the Confederates
and thereby prevent them from acquiring the stockpile. The comment was even
passed that if Ripley was still so resistant to the use of the Enfields, that
at the least the guns should be purchased and dumped into the ocean so the
Confederate states couldn't use them.
The staffer
was dismissed and ordered never to bring the subject up again.
Three months
later, at Manassas, over thirty-five thousand Union troops went into battle,
armed primarily with aging smoothbores. Their final assault up Henry Hill came
within mere yards of carrying the day and breaking the back of Confederate
resistance. That final gallant charge, however, was shredded by the
concel1trated volleys of Stonewall Jackson's men, armed primarily with newly
issued Enfield Rifles that could kill at four hundred yards and were murderous
at a hundred yards or less, a range at which the smoothbores of the Union were
still all but useless.
Finally
buckling to pressure from the administration, Ripley broke down and started to
order Enfields, but by then it was too late; the initial stockpile was already
in the South. One of the ironies of the war was that the British continued to
manufacture Enfields, with both Union and Confederate purchasing agents waiting
at the end of the assembly line. In desperation Ripley turned to the Prussians,
who were more than eager to sell off their own muzzleloaders since the Prussian
army had already converted to bolt-action breechloaders. These muzzleloaders,
and additional arms purchased from the Belgians, were almost all condemned as
more dangerous to the man behind the gun than to the target in front of it. As
to the far more advanced breechloaders such as the Sharps and Burnside rifles,
or the highly advanced Spencers, many Union regiments simply stepped around the
bureaucracy by purchasing the weapons with their own funds, accepting with a
cold, simple logic that their lives on the battlefield depended on superior
firepower and they were willing to take money out of their monthly pay of
twelve dollars to purchase it, along with the "expensive" ammunition
Ripley kept complaining about.
One of the
great mythologies of the American Civil War is that throughout the war the
Confederate Armies labored under the burden of inferior equipment. This was
definitely not true in the first year of the war, thanks to Colonel Ripley.
Right up until the summer of 1862 Union troops, especially in the western
theater of operations, fought primarily with smoothbores, while the vast
majority of Confederate troops were armed with Enfields. Without the Enfields,
the Southern cause might very well have collapsed on the battlefields of 1861
and early 1862. If they had been forced to confront a Union army outfitted with
breechloaders and been denied access to the Enfield as well, without a doubt
there never would have been a Second Manassas, an Antietam, a Gettysburg, or
the bloody killing match of the Wilderness Campaign.
His army
lost most of their first battles, they were outgunned and outranged by the very
rifles he could have bought, he fought change so that the Gatling gun and
repeating rifles barely appeared, and more than any other person his decisions
may have prolonged the American Civil War for years. As for Ripley himself, who
was finally pushed out in 1863, it is doubtful if he ever considered that there
was an alternative to his fateful decision or a need to apologize for his gaffe
later.